

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH POSITIONS

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*is interested in these candidates:*

B.A., M.A., & Ph.D.

in: • INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
• POLITICAL SCIENCE • HISTORY  
• SOCIOLOGY • ANTHROPOLOGY  
• JOURNALISM • ECONOMICS  
• AREA STUDIES

### GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

To identify, assess, and report to the top policy level of the Government on events in foreign countries having a bearing on the security of the United States. This requires sensitivity to developing trends and the ability to synthesize political, economic, and military intelligence regarding the stability, intentions and capabilities of foreign governments. The ability to write clearly and succinctly is critical, as is the ability to present ideas verbally in a clear and brief manner. Some positions involve research in depth and the preparation of studies concerned primarily with political and sociological dynamics. Positions are located in Washington, D.C.

### GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS:

**Education:** B.A., M.A., or Ph.D. in one of the disciplines listed. Knowledge of a specific country or area and ability to do research in the local language are desirable, but not essential. (Outstanding candidates in other disciplines will also be considered.)

**Age:** Preferably 21-35 (positions for both men and women).

**Citizenship:** U. S. Citizen of unquestioned loyalty and character.

**Physical Requirements:** In general good health. Routine examination is required.

### INITIAL ANNUAL SALARY:

\$6,400 through \$10,900 depending upon education and experience qualifications.

### ADVANTAGES:

- Qualified employees may be included in Government sponsored training programs involving Agency and other Government courses, tuition subsidies for study at local universities, and in some cases full time study with full salary and tuition paid
- Periodic orientation trips to areas of specialization
- Association and work with experts in various professional fields
- Government sponsored life and health insurance at minimum cost
- Excellent advancement opportunities for career employees
- Liberal sick and vacation leave
- Civil Service Retirement program.

*Interview may be arranged with representatives of the Agency on \_\_\_\_\_*

*Please communicate with \_\_\_\_\_*

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19 September 1967

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
MAHON SUBCOMMITTEE

COMMUNIST CHINA

- I. The situation in China is extremely fluid, and has never been more precarious since 1949.
  - A. Steadily worsening disorders this summer have brought China to the most serious crisis since the Communists seized control of the mainland.
- II. There have been reports of violent conflict from every province.
  - A. Groups of fanatic Red Guard extremists are fighting one another.
    - 1. Savage and bloody clashes are reported between Red Guards and organized workers, in some cases incited by local authorities to resist Mao's Cultural Revolution.
    - 2. Casualty figures indicate that the death toll in large cities numbers in the thousands. Hospitals are said to be filled with wounded Red Guards and workers.
  - B. For the first time in the Cultural Revolution, regular military weapons are being

used on a wide scale.

1. Previously only fists, stones, and sharpened poles were used in most clashes.
2. Now, however, rifles and machine guns and even tanks and artillery are being used.
3. Many civilian groups have been armed on the authority of Peking itself.

Others have managed to acquire weapons by raiding government arsenals, which seem to be lightly guarded these days.

C. During the past two weeks, local authorities have been trying to recover these weapons, but with only limited success.

1. Most Red Guard factions are unwilling to render themselves defenseless by surrendering arms. Some have been turning in pistols while retaining machine guns.

III. Peking's control over the situation appears to be weakening steadily.

A. The central committee has repeatedly ordered the army to intervene to stop the fighting.

1. These directives have not been vigorously enforced, however. In general, the army seems to be reluctant to get involved, and in some areas it is backing local groups against Maoist partisans.

B. Maoist leaders in Peking may be getting more confused and desperate. Their latest directive, publicized last week, urged workers to "make revolution" only after working hours. It promised stern punishment for those who fight on government time.

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workers are now being bussed in the afternoon to the outskirts of the city, where they are allowed to fight to their hearts' content. The dead bodies are picked up the next morning.

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IV. Whatever the various roots of China's domestic turmoil, its effects are becoming daily more evident and now the economy is beginning to feel the pressure.

A. Trains run haphazardly.

[redacted]  
there have been serious disruptions in rail and river transport all over the country for many weeks.

B. Key industrial centers have suffered sporadic shut-downs, and such reports are growing in volume and frequency.

V. In short, the outlook for Maoist leaders and Maoist ideas has never been bleaker.

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- A. There is little question that if Mao and company do not call off or moderate their Revolution--which they would be most reluctant to do--the result will be greater chaos, and perhaps a state of complete anarchy.
- B. Beyond this, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the crisis with any confidence.
- C. One possibility is that the situation might be resolved by fragmentation of China into a number of "independent kingdoms."
  - 1. This would leave China far from stability, even after new political organizations were set up. In all likelihood, it would mean a repetition of China's history during the 1920s, when warlords contended for power and the people suffered.
- D. A somewhat more likely outcome is the creation of a truly organized opposition to Mao, which will force him to moderate the present disastrous policies.
- E. The formation of such an opposition would

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be a desperate business, requiring a nearly unanimous decision by a large body of powerful and ambitious men if civil war is to be avoided.

1. Given the situation in China today, even a rough prediction of timing is impossible.
2. It seems likely, however, that new and more serious domestic problems could drive the military and the moderates to act.
3. The upcoming fall harvest, and the crucial distribution time immediately following, might be a time when such problems could develop.

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